Jaswant Singh's History of Freedom Struggle

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Book ReferenceLine 12 to 23

Author’s Views: From the book “Ten Years of Freedom” by Kanji Dwarkadas, the author quotes Sardar Patel. Patel scathingly questioned, to the effect, as to how could the Congress come to terms with the British Government when they might have to deal with Japanese in six months time. Patel remarked that Cripps was coming at a time when it might be impossible for the British government to give India anything or for India to take anything. The author faults Patel that this was directly contradicting his stance of August 1940 when he openly conveyed that a section of the Congress wanted to arrive at some kind of agreement with the British Government.

Comments: Had not the circumstances changed from 1940 to 1942? Was Japan at the doorsteps of India in 1940? Japan had already over run Burma and the British had withdrawn tactically leaving their Colonies to the mercy of the Japanese. What was the guarantee that the British would not do so if the Japanese over run India too? The British government had made India thoroughly impotent to face any armed aggression. The forces of the Princely states were only ceremonial. They might even pledge their allegiance to Japan in such a scenario, after all they had no qualms of being subservient to British for the past hundreds of years. The police forces in India did not have adequate firearms even to fight criminals. There was acute scarcity of food and other essential commodities of daily needs. Naturally, if the Japanese came and the British withdrew like they did in Burma, or if they sign a treaty as they did in Munich (the infamous Western Betrayal), what would have been the plight of India? What would have been there for the British to offer and for us to take if that turned out to be the case? In the political field, the leaders have to take stand on the merits of the proposals best suited to the prevailing conditions. So can we still say that Sardar Patel changed his stance in 1942 without compelling reasons?

In page 296 the author concludes that His Majesty’s government did not want a resolution of the problem in India at that time and definitely not when Churchill was the Prime Minister. If that was the conclusion drawn by the author, why he should blame Sardar Patel for his change of stance.

Book Reference: Page 268 line 22 -24

Author’s Views: The author , while concluding the reasons for the British to promote the Muslim League as their clear policy, says to the effect that it should have been obvious to the Congress not to have been fooled by such an apparent British trick. However he qualifies that all of his conclusions are in hindsight.

Comments: When we read the sequence of events as described in pages 266 onwards, the conclusion as to all this being in hindsight is not convincing. Many of the things, for many of the people of those times were pretty obvious , especially so, for seasoned politicians like Gandhi and Jinnah and not in the least the Viceroy. Krishana Menon’s rejoinder from The India Office is proof enough that Congress was aware of the game.

That Jinnah gave a convincing reply in the form of declaring “Deliverance Day” in response to Linlinthgow’s request to rebut the claims of India Office further re-enforced the Congress doubts. Linlithgow’s idea of sending a Muslim delegation also clearely showed the tacit understanding between the Viceroy and the League to the Congress. It was only the timing, when Jinnah was going to declare openly for the partition of the Country and inform the Viceroy formally the demand for the same, which were not known at that time (ie 1939) to the Congress . (Page 272).

Gandhi and the Congress leaders were clever enough to discern the game the Viceroy was up to. From proportional representation to parity, then on to decrying the Federal Scheme of the government of India Act and then to ask for a separate state of Pakistan, the British government through the Viceroy played their cards well to promote the demands of the League and alienate it from the Congress irrevocably . This was in order to divide the country on communal lines as per their long term strategy to have a buffer state in the west and east. That they used the League was also very clear to Gandhi. That was the reason that Gandhi was always right up to the end making the plea "that our problems should be sorted out among ourselves," ( and) not to involve the British to intervene. The author himself questions (page 273), whether the demand for Pakistan by the League was the constructive proposal, the Viceroy was demanding from them. It was undoubtedly so.

All their (the British) projections as being neutral to all the partys concerned later on (after the War and preceding independence) were only hogwash.

That the author has omitted to add in this narrative that the Muslim League was a partner in "that obvious British trick" is perhaps the author's trick!

Book Reference: Page 263 para 1

Author’s Views: The author in para 1 Page 263, states that the Viceroy was confident of his powers to deal with any campaign of civil disobedience. He also states the Muslim league was neutral in its support to the British war efforts. He surmises that fearing the dangers of Congress and Muslim hostility as they had done during Khilafat movement and also 1857, the Viceroy was left with the only choice of courting Jinnah and his party.

Comments: The conclusion of the author as above is totally misplaced. The Viceroy had already known the reaction of Jinnah whether he wanted the Congress ministries to be thrown out. (Page 261). He also knew as early as 1938 that if he kept the Congress at bay he would get un-stinted support from Jinnah (Page 264). He (the Viceroy) also knew that, after examining carefully, there were no specific instances of repression in the Congress-ruled Provinces (Page 262). He was confident that any civil disobedience campaign by the Congress could be put down. 1857 shadow likely troubling the British crown (Page 263) was utterly improbable since Muslims supporting the Congress was out of the question in view of the understanding reached between the Viceroy and Jinnah as early as August 1938(Page 264). Jinnah was totally opposed to Congress supporting Khilafat movement and decried Gandhi in no uncertain terms (Page 125). Where was the question of them coming together now to threaten the British war efforts? As the author himself quotes (Page 264) the Viceroy was aware that he could rely on Jinnah’s support as Jinnah had indicated as early as August 1938, of Muslim League’s co-operation with the British. Jinnah would not therefore come to any agreement with the Congress with respect to the stand to be taken on British war efforts and in asking them to spell out their war aims. Jinnah, (as quoted by the author from Linlithgow Papers Page 269), promising to give a befitting reply to India League rejoinder further reinforces his stand.

At least Congress was honest enough to oppose the declaration of war and resigned from the ministries on moral grounds though they knew very well that their action would give the Government unfettered powers in pursuing its war effort in addition to indirectly helping the Muslim league to consolidate its position with their (the Government) help. It is therefore obvious that Jinnah was grateful to Linlithgow for his help. The Viceroy by his masterstroke was able to widen the divide between the Congress and the League so as to further consolidate the British power.

Where was the question of Hindus and Muslims coming together like they did during Khilafat movement now (1939?) and where is the question of 1857 repeating when the Viceroy was very rightly confident of suppressing any civil disobedience by the Congress. All princely states by now are ruling only in name and real control was with the Residents. The British Indian Army was highly trained and organized. There is was vast improvement in communication, road and rail network to facilitate movement of forces and suppress any upraising. 1939 was not 1857!

Having an assured co-operation from the Muslim League and having obtained such assurances from other major and minor political parties for support and having confidence that the Government was capable of handling any Disobedience Movement by the Congress, the Viceroy felt no necessity to summon an All-Parties Conference, which he planned earlier.

The Viceroy was promoting Jinnah and his party not because he was left with no other choice , but did so to weaken the Congress and prolong the British Rule.

Book Reference: Page 260-262

Author’s Views: Detailing on the declaration Of India as a combatant country and an ally by the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow on 4 September 1939, the author states protests flared up instantly on this announcement. He later states that neither Gandhi nor any other responsible leader criticized the statement and these criticisms came much later.

The author further states that on 4th September, the Viceroy saw Jinnah and even before that Sikandar Hayat Khan had pledged the support of Punjab and Bengal and publicly affirmed his position irrespective whatever Jinnah and his friends might say.

Quoting from the book “ The Viceroy at Bay- Lord Linlithgow in India 1936-1943, the Author further narrates that Jinnah bargained for a complete reshaping of the constitution as a means of strengthening his hand and to show some thing positive to his followers. He urged the Viceroy to throw out the Congress ministries. On questioned by the Viceroy how India to obtain self-government if not by democracy, he replied that partition of the country was the escape route. The author further states that late in 1939, the Muslim league did not come out openly to support the Government’s war effort nor did they oppose it (page 263)

Comments: The author first states protests flared up instantly on the declaration by Viceroy. At the same breath, he says neither Gandhi nor any other Congress leader criticized the statement. The term “much later” used by the author is relative. It could be hours, days, weeks or months. Muslim support from Punjab and Bengal was instantaneous. There is no record in the book which shows that either Jinnah or any other League leader protested the declaration.

Let us now see the other actual position. Gandhi reached Simla on September 5th on the invitation of the Viceroy and issued a statement. Excerpts “I knew I had no authority to speak for any person except myself. I had no instructions whatsoever from the Working Committee ( of the Congress) in the matter…… I had told H.E. as much. I have returned from Viceregal Lodge without any understanding open or secret. If there is to be any, it would be between the Congress and the Government”

The Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met on September 10. It gave its support to Great Britain and with a view to make such cooperation effective, the Mahasabha urged the introduction of responsible Government at the Centre, revision of communal award and enlistment of more Hindus in the Army.

The Muslim League came out with its war declaration on September 10. It expressed its great appreciation of Lord Linlithgow inviting Jinnah for consultations. The resolution strongly criticized and condemned the federal scheme, and alleged that the working of the provincial autonomy resulted in domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minority, whose life and liberty, property and honour were in danger and even their religious rights and culture were being assailed and annihilated everyday. The resolution warned the British Government that it could count on the Muslim support only on two conditions: Muslims must be given justice and fair play in the Congress Provinces and no assurances must be given for constitutional advance nor any constitution framed without the consent and approval of the League “the only organization that can speak on behalf of Muslim India.”

The Liberal Federation, All-India Christian Conference and the Indian Princes stood for unconditional assistance to the Government.

While every other party was bargaining for their support to the Government for its war effort, let us now see the statement of the Working Committee of the Congress issued on 14 September:

“ The British Government has declared India as a belligerent country, promulgated ordinances, passed Government of India Act Amending Bill and taken many other far reaching measures …. This has been done without the consent of the Indian people….The Congress has repeatedly declared its entire disapproval of the ideology and practice of fascism and Nazism and their glorification of war and violence and suppression of human spirit…… The issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian People and no outside authority can impose the decision upon them…… India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom when that very freedom is denied to her and such limited freedom, as she possesses taken away from her. If war is to defend the status quo, imperialists possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then India can have nothing to do with it…..The Congress Working Committee, invite the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their war aims are in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new order that is envisaged and in particular how these aims are going to apply to India and given effect at present." How much later this has come?10 days after the declaration by the Viceroy. (The Congress took four days for debating the issue in their working Committee for drafting their statement.)

On not consulting the Constituent assembly, the author quotes Lord Linlithgow asking (page 261) the representatives of the Crown as to what would have been his position had the Congress refused his request.(regarding declaring India at war). The author adds his own comment that perhaps they would have done so. The point is why should the Viceroy or the British Crown needed to worry whether Congress approves or not . After all even if they don’t approve could the decision of the Crown or the Viceroy be set aside or changed! They were the rulers!

Also to note, there arose no need for the Viceroy to turn out the Provincial Governments headed by the Congress, as was required by Jinnah. They all resigned on their own in spite of the fact that the leadership of the Congress Party was fully aware that they would cease to have any voice and they would give unfettered powers to the Viceroy and the Governors. Still they resigned taking a principled stand.

Book Reference: Page 242- 243

Author’s views: The author narrates the episode of Sikandar Hayat Khan pleading for postponement of federation in July 1938 with the Viceroy, and his proposal to dividing India into six or seven regional groups which would include Pakistan as one of them. He also proposed a complicated system of representation so as to prevent Hindu majority in any future legislature. The author avers that the Viceroy had to listen to even such an absurd logic so as not offend the Muslims, as they badly needed them as allies. The British could not afford to have both the communities (Hindu and Muslim) alienated and working against the Raj. The author concludes that the events of 1857 (Sepoy Mutiny) continued to trouble the British psyche for as long as they remained in India.

Comments: Congress was already alienated. The Muslim league was alienated against the Congress. It was therefore axiomatic that they ( the British) befriend the Muslims to prolong their rule. The reason was not the shadow of Eighteen Fifty Seven. In 1857 the East India Company had scant support from the British Crown. It could muster only its own Company forces and those of some of the Princely States. By now (1938), the British government was well established, had its own British Indian Army with a vastly improved communication network. It had forces available from nearby colonies as well. By now the British had already fought and won the First World War. It is therefore difficult to digest that the shadow of 1857 would be threatening them even in 1938. They feared more Gandhi’s non-violent struggle and the international opinion for taking drastic punitive measures. To make the Congress weak, they have to befriend, promote and instigate the Muslim League, in which, they succeeded in no small measure. This is evident from the very next paragraph in the same page. Around the second half of 1938, the author says that Jinnah had suggested to the Acting Viceroy that to keep the Central government, the British should protect the Muslims in the Congress Provinces and that the Muslims, in exchange, would protect the British Raj in Delhi. Was not this tacit understanding the reason for the postponement of the realization of the freedom and also the partition? This is further amplified / clarified by the author himself on the very next page. The author narrates the quotes from “ The Viceroy at Bay –Lord Linlithgow in India 1936-1943”. After Linlithgow had a long talk with Jinnah, as a record of this conversation to Lord Zetland, Secretary of State wrote to the effect that Jinnah admitted with some reluctance that it looked very much as though that carving up of the country was the position that was going to emerge. ….the only possible course for the Muslims to take in those circumstances was to continue to abuse the British as loudly as possible …. Behind the scenes they might adopt a more co-operative attitude-

In Pages253 to 256, Khaliqizzaman’s meeting with Col. Muirhead and then with Lord Zetland are narrated in detail. The reader may kindly go through the book . Khaliqizzaman brought it to the knowledge of Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India in London in March 1939, what the stand of the Muslim League would be in their next session: “that the British should partition the Muslim areas from the rest of India and proceed with their scheme of federation of Indian Provinces and that the Muslim areas should be independent of the rest. As far as the Princely states they should follow their geographical situation. Jinnah was made aware of the entire conversation by Khaliqizzaman immediately after his arrival in India.

It is amply clear that decision to seek a separate independent state for Muslims was a foregone conclusion for the top leadership of the Muslim League was reiterated as far back as 1939. What is relevant to note is that the League was prepared to leave the Muslims in other Provinces where they were not in majority and those Muslims in the Princely states (who might be geographically separated) to their fate! (Ie. finding themselves the slaves of the majority in the words of Khaliqizzaman). This implies that though they professed to be the one and only agency to speak on behalf of the whole of Muslims in the British India which included the Princely States, they were only concerned about the so called feared slavery of Muslims in Bengal, Punjab, Sind, Assam and North West Frontier Province where Muslims were physically in majority! Even continuation of slavery under British was more acceptable than the feared democracy of free undivided India!

Book Reference: Page 236 -238

Author’s views: The author while debating "Secularism" concludes that the break down of coalition negotiations contributed to an eventual partition of the country in 1947. In the same breath, he also says that Jinnah came to the conclusion that it was the British who wielded the ultimate power and therefore it was they who could share or transfer any part of that power. Therefore there was no need for him to come to any terms with the Congress.

Comments: Very true. That he was prepared to share power with the British denotes that he was emphatic about transfer of power. His continuation of voicing his opposition to British rule was only an eyewash. (As we will see later in page 243 as the author narrates the record of conversation of the Viceroy with Jinnah and his observations during second half of 1938.)

In Page 238, the author concludes that the Muslims had by that time decided that they should be an effective opposition to the Hindu Congress . Because of the misjudgment and combined effect of the actions and policies of the Congress the chances of a united India becoming independent were receding. (The reader is urged to read the original text in the book to truly appreciate as to what the Author implies.)

Comments: One fundamental fact seems to have been overlooked here by the author. In spite of winning the elections the Congress declined even to form the ministries for good three to four months. It was not that the electoral gains had gone to their heads and they would knowingly sow the seeds either for delaying the realization of Swaraj or for dividing India. Neither Nehru nor other leaders were so foolish to act as implied by the learned author. What he has written above (Page 236) stands nullified if we take this statement in its face value (page 238) and vice versa.

(Why the author should term the Congress of 1939 as Hindu Congress? What was the religious composition of the members of the Congress party of 1939? Were there not members belonging to any other religion apart from Hindus at that time in the Congress Party? Were not many able leaders belonging to other religions and classes including depressed in the Congress at that time? One can understand the leaders of the League terming it as “this Hindu Congress”, but how a learned author and historian of repute like Mr. Jaswant Singh can term it as such is beyond imagination.)

Also it was too early (the year was1939) to arrive at this conclusion. The fact that Pakistan or a buffer state needed to be created for politico strategic reasons on the western side was a long felt necessity for the British Crown, whether India gains dominion status or full freedom at any future date. The NWFP having a Congress majority, though of predominantly Muslim population, was a thorn in their flesh. The fear that at any future date they could join hands with Afghans was also weighing in their heads. A convenient escape route for the British was to assiduously cultivate and prop up the bogey of safeguarding the interest of the minorities and push up the stakes of the Muslim League as a counter balance. This in effect was the actual reason for the partition of India, as we will see later.

Book Reference: Page 226 Line 11-18

Author’s Views: The author quotes that Jinnah in his address at the 25th Session of the All-India Muslim League in October 1937 questioned, (a) whether accepting offices by the Congress, when the assurances that were required before offices could be accepted were refused and(b) working the Provincial Constitution enacted by the British Parliament, which was forced upon the people of India by Imperialistic power, were in consonance with the policy and programme and the declaration of the Congress party.

Commenting on the above speech, the author declares that Jinnah’s argument of unity between the Congress and the League was unimpeachable.

The author concludes that, for so long as Congress was in office, as a constitutionalist organization, it occupied the same position like the British authorities and the British Crown.

Comments: The fact that Muslim League also contested the election would indicate that, had they become victorious, they would also have taken up the office! The fact was Congress secured an overwhelming victory at the polls and was returned as a majority party in six out of 11 provinces and as the largest single party in all. It is significant to note that out of 1585 seats there were only 657 seats open to general category and still Congress won a total of 715 seats. In the predominantly Muslim Frontier Province Congress candidates won 15 of 36 seats reserved for Muslims while Muslim league could not secure a single seat. In Madras the pro- British Justice Party, which had been in control from 1922 could secure only 21 seats. The Liberal party was wiped out. The Democratic Swaraj Party, which opposed the Congress, also failed. The Hindu Mahasabha failed completely. The Muslim League did better but on the whole its showing was poor especially in the predominantly Muslim provinces –only 4% voted for the league. In Punjab and Sind it failed completely. The Times (of london), who so far castigated Congress as an insignificant minority had to change its opinion and wrote “ The elections have shown that Congress party alone is organized on more than a provincial basis…The party has won its victories on issues which interested millions of Indian rural voters and scores of millions who had no votes”.

There are a lot of written records regarding the acceptance office by the Congress. An assurance was sought that the Governors will not use their special powers of interference or set aside the advice of the cabinet in regard to the constitutional activities. There was a deadlock due to which the ministries did not take office till July. The deadlock was broken on the Viceroy’s statement implying that “ it is only when the issue between a Governor and his minister constitutes a serious disagreement that any question of the severing of their partnership need arise”.

Regarding the author’s declaration of Jinnah’s stand on Congress League unity, we have to retrace the Chapter 5. The author admits in the opening paragraph (page 207), that top leaders of the League of 1935-36 were mostly comprised of rich and titled persons, landlords and zamindars, nawabs and other self serving favour seekers. The elections were held in 1937 and there were not much changes in the composition of leadership of the League in the intervening period. In page 221, the author, while analyzing, the after effects of the results of the election of 1937, naming some of the leaders, says they did not respond to Jinnah’s call for unity of Muslims but were swayed by personal and class interests. In the very next para (in page 221), the author quotes Dr. Zaidi, to conclude that the leadership of the League went into elections as idealists and emerged as realists!

If Jinnah’s argument of unity between congress and the League was beyond reproach, why he should make an appeal for “Muslim Unity” for the elections. After all idealistic elections are to be fought based on party policies rather than on religious grounds. If that is accepted, how can we call any one an “idealist” if he seeks support based on religious affiliation?

The author certifies firstly, that most of them were self serving favour seekers. Secondly he says some of them were more affiliated to personal gains and self interests. Thirdly he conveys they were idealists to start with, ie before elections and changed as realists after the results of the elections as acutely observed by Dr.Zaidi.

Next regarding “assuming of office”: If assuming office placed them(either Congress or the League) in same constitutional position as the British Crown, why the Muslim League contested the elections in the first place? They should have not only boycotted the elections but also persuaded the Congress to do so. The controversy arose only when the Congress having won a big victory, was not in a mood to allocate portfolios to Muslim MLAs of the League and inducted into the cabinet Muslims who belonged to the Congress party. Had the Congress done otherwise, and acted as per the wishes of the League, what stand Jinnah would have taken? The question of course is hypothetical, but rational in any case. In that case not only the Congress but also the League would have been placed in the same constitutional position as the British Crown. Was that acceptable?

The rhetoric of Jinnah appears more as the story of the grapes turning sour!