Jaswant Singh's History of Freedom Struggle

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Book Reference: Page 440 Para 2

Author’s Views: Narrating the Radcliffe Commission and Awards, the author states that in spite of his standing as an eminent citizen of Great Britain, Cyril John Radcliffe became a highly controversial figure as the Chairman of the Boundary Commission to delineate the new boundaries. To ensure neutrality of such a Commission, the author emphasizes that relationship between politics and administration can never be mutually exclusive and there will not be non-partisan administrators to work out the partitioning process. The author further narrates that Jinnah favoured a commission composed of three impartial non-Indians appointed on the recommendation of the United Nations. The Congress (Nehru) opposed Jinnah’s above proposal. Comparing this act of opposition by Nehru, the author remarks that it is ironical that Nehru, as the Prime Minister of India referred in great hurry, poor judgment and due to Lord Mountbatten’s insistence referred the Kashmir issue to the UN.

Comments: I am surprised how the author has overlooked a basic difference. When Nehru referred the J&K Issue to UN, (hasty, ill-judged, goaded or otherwise), India and Pakistan had already become separate Nations and were at war. How can Congress or Nehru ask UN to intervene when in 1947, the nation itself was still under the British and the dispute was between two political entities of a yet to be born free nation? If the dispute was to be referred to UN, it could be initiated only by the British who have still not vacated India! To justify the demand of Jinnah for a UN appointed Commission, the author advances his theory that politics and administration can never be mutually exclusive and the administration can never be just and impartial in a political system in spite of the oft repeated claims to the contrary.

Does the author imply that where as we have the federal structure in place, the administration is overshadowed by politics? The author has been a Minister in the Central Government holding important portfolios for a fairly long period of time and is a Parliamentarian of repute. Does he mean all Commissions for arbitrating disputes among the States in India were/are partial and swayed by political considerations? Does the author want the water sharing dispute between Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, the border disputes between Maharshtra and Karnataka and the demand for Telengana etc to be referred to UN appointed Commissions? The politicians when they become parliamentarians or Executives as ministers take an oath to uphold the Constitution of India and to discharge their duties without any bias or favour. The author might have been swayed by the corroded present day political and administrative climate to make such a sweeping conclusion. The British, what ever else they can be accused of, were never faulted for their water- tight separation of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary.

Book Reference: Page 419

Author’s Views: Commenting on the Congress Working Committee Resolution of 8th March 1947, the author concludes that it was a sad commentary on the Congress party, which just about a thirty years ago, opposed even the partition of Bengal to have proposed the partition of India.

Comments: Should we then give the credit for creating Pakistan to Congress and its leaders? I feel robbing this credit from the Muslim League headed by Jinnah is blatantly unfair.

The author, in page 420, quoting from the book ‘Last days of the Raj', informs that VP Menon, the Reforms Commissioner and Advisor to the Viceroy, recapitulated a talk he had with Patel in Simla. He is reported to have told Patel that Jinnah had the support of influential British opinion in his claim for Pakistan, and also more importantly, Jinnah was supported by most of the high officers of the Army in India. (Please read my last post in this blog , the part played by the British Officer Sir. Robert McGregor McDonald Lochart who took over as the Army Chief on August 15, 1947 on Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir in October.)

Why should the author also rob the British and of the high British Army officers (there were not many Commissioned Indian Officers holding high ranks in those days) the credit for the creation of Pakistan?

In page 449, the author asserts that only Jinnah could have mastered Fazl-ul Haq, Sir Sikandar and Khizar who were opposed to Pakistan. Jinnah united the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab despite these leaders and made them demand Pakistan. The author asserts that there was no other Muslim leader to even attempt such a feat, much less achieve success in it. Pakistan, the author concludes, was becoming a reality as a result of Jinnah’s individual “pertinacity.” ( whatever it may mean). (Please read authors original text to appreciate his vehement narration). Why he then blames the Congress for the partition?

Also compare from what the author states in Page 489. The answer (cure?), Jinnah asserted, lay only in parting. Nehru and Patel and others of the Congress followed.

While the Congress Party was working its way to obtain freedom of the entire Nation, Mr. Jinnah was working for the creation of Pakistan alone. To that extent he even favoured a Commission of three impartial non-Indians appointed on the recommendation of the United Nations to delineate the boundaries. In effect, he did not believe in the neutrality of even the British who were all along been favourable to him and with whom he had a tacit understanding. ( 'we will keep you safe in Delhi ' to keep the Congress at bay!)

Book Reference: Page 383 -385

Author’s Views: The author as a prelude to the Calcutta riots of August 1946 narrates various troubles that were simmering in Calcutta from 1945 onwards. Though he qualifies these events as non-communal , he says that the after effects of these strikes though non-communal and concerned with local issues, overlapped each other promoting violence and disorder. The reader is urged to go through the original text.

Comments: It appears that the author wants the reader to believe that the killings and arson in Calcutta as a fall out of ‘Direct Action day’ are to be taken as a matter of routine. Because as per the author, after all , that was the way things were happening in Calcutta from November 1945 onwards for almost a year and there was nothing to suggest that the killings and arson from August 16 to August 19, 1946 (with the full connivance of the Local Government) were anything different!!! How bizarre his intentions are.

It is a well-known fact supported by recorded evidence, that in support of the resolution of July 29 of the Muslim League for "Direct Action" for creation of Pakistan, inflammatory speeches were made. Statements and pamphlets by responsible members of the League and Ministers were circulated widely to inflame a large section of Muslim masses. The government of Bengal declared August 16 as a public holiday. This created an impression that the observance of August 16 as ‘Direct Action day’ was tacitly approved by the Government of Bengal and any one not joining could claim no protection from the Government. There was no police, not even traffic police to be seen on August 16. The curfew order was not enforced even after it was proclaimed for the first two nights. Detailed description of the mayhem is available in the world wide web (Search for Calcutta Killings of August 1946) and I need not deal with it further. But the question to be asked to the author, did all other agitations, protests and riots from November 1945 onwards (as the author narrates in the pages quoted above), had the same response from the government like the ones on August 16-19?

In a public meeting in Delhi, Ganzafar Ali Khan declared, “ the aim of our direct action is to paralyze Nehru’s Government which will vanish like the historic half-day rule of Nizam the water carrier ….Muslims will resist such a government with their blood.”

Were such inflammatory speeches made to incite the public for other agitations in Calcutta from November 1945? Does the author want to state that the Calcutta killings and arson of August 16-19 are nothing peculiar but to be taken as routine events of Calcutta? Why he is trying to defend an indefensible?

Book Reference: Page 372 -378

Author’s Views: Discussing about the issue of parity and Jinnah’s opposition to various modifications and invitations sent directly to the Muslim Leaders by the Government etc, the author states that Jinnah even at that stage did not refuse to participate in the interim government.

Comments: In the same page (373), the author states, on 19 Jun 1946 he raised the issue again with Wavell. He objected to change in the composition. Though he was fully authorized by the Working Committee of the League to take any decision as he deemed fit, he raised the sham of referring the matter before the Working Committee. He objected to the way the Viceroy sent invitations directly to the Muslim Leaguers to join the interim government. He objected to the nomination of Mr. Jagjivan Ram by the Congress. Still the author wants the readers to believe that Jinnah did not refuse to participate in the government though he was making it very clear that in case he did not have his way, he would not agree to participate.

Page 373: The author states that the letter of the Congress President to the Viceroy, and the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, of June 25, 1946 actually confused the matter. He concludes that the game of one-upmanship had become destructive. The author goes on to give some excerpts though later on says summarizing them or making an outline of them would be full of incalculable danger!

Comments: The author gives the impression that the matter became complex due to one-up man ship of the Congress and secondly due to the (valid) points raised by the Congress to reiterate its policy that they are free to decide whom to delegate and thirdly due to the the reported refusal of the Viceroy to accept a Congress Muslim member among the representatives of the Congress. The Viceroy had earlier assured that he could not accept the right of the Congress to object to names put forward by the Muslim league any more than he would accept similar objections from the other side. For argument sake, if we assume that a non congress scheduled caste member later switches his allegiance/ support to Congress after the formation of the interim government what would happen? Would he say “I will not resign since I am appointed by the Viceroy, though now I have switched my loyalty to Congress?” Or was it that Mr. Jinnah wanted a man of his choice to represent the scheduled castes also?

We have to remember that Mr. Jinnah had already made up his mind. He was apprehensive that once he agrees to the formation and functioning of the constitution making body, the realization of Pakistan would recede to a later date. It is therefore not out of place when the Secretary of State accused Jinnah of sabotaging the prospects for an interim government, laying the blame on Jinnah for publishing his letter to Wavell of 19 Jun. (Page 376) Had it not been published neither the Congress President would have written the letter nor the Congress Working Committee would have sent the resolution. While that was the case, the author blaming the Congress for confounding the problem is baseless.

Page 377: The author states to the effect that due to the Cabinet Mission’s refusal to invite the Muslim League alone to form the interim government, communal rioting in an ugly form again broke out in Ahmedabad.

Comments: How could the Cabinet Mission invite only Muslim League to form the interim government? The Mission tried its level best to accommodate, as much as it could, the demands of Mr. Jinnah so that the interests of the Muslim League were adequately guaranteed. But as said before the fear of the League lay elsewhere. The fear of the unknown as to how the constitution will take shape. Mr. Jinnah was always insisting on drafting two different bodies for evolving two different Constitutions, one for the Muslims and the other for others. He was perhaps apprehensive whether his aim of the carving out a sovereign state of Pakistan will fructify in the near future. His health was already deteriorating.

Page 378: Commenting on the Press Conference of Jawaharlal Nehru of 10 July 1946 and its after effects, the author says that it is difficult to believe that Nehru would not have anticipated what the fall out of such conference or his interviews could be.

Comments: Is it not equally difficult to give the benefit of doubt to Mr. Jinnah for not having known in advance what, the fall out will be of his releasing to the press his letter to Wavell of 19 June. Irrespective what Azad commented on Nehru’s interview and what Patel said of Nehru’s emotional immaturity (page 380- 381), Nehru’s interview gave a reasoning and an opportunity for Mr. Jinnah to refuse co-operation. The fact remains that it took another two months (2nd September 1946 to be precise) for the announcement of the appointment of the new council. In the interim, Nehru in his capacity as the President of the Congress wrote to Jinnah, suggesting a coalition government. (Notwithstanding the author appreciating of Wavell’s objectivity to have termed the Congress acquiescence as a dishonest acceptance Page 377). Jinnah replied that “ that the Wardha resolution of the Congress of 8 August 1946 does not call for a revision of the League decision.” In effect it was either we alone or whom we nominate and accept as members of the interim Government or we boycott!!! That is the crux of Jinnah’s stand, which the readers must appreciate.

In spite of the assurance that the British Government would adhere to the Cabinet Mission plan of 16 May, given in the British parliament on 18 July, the Muslim League Council in Bombay on 27 July 1946 reiterated the demand for Pakistan and declared August 16 as "Direct Action "day. Does the author still wants us to beleive that Jinnah did not refuse to participate in the interim government?

Book Reference: Page 341 – 353 Simla Conference of June 1945

Author’s Views: Page 341: It came to light later that Jinnah had expressed it as a grievance Gandhi’s withdrawal from the ( Simla) conference.

Comments: Compare (from page 313) when Gandhi, after obtaining Jinnah’s concurrence, went to meet him in Bombay on 9 September 1944 at his residence. At the very outset Jinnah questioned the representative capacity of Gandhi in meeting him as Gandhi had no political status at that time. Where is the grievance now (in 1945) for Gandhi’s non-participation in the Simla Conference, when Gandhi’s status has not changed politically? As the author narrates from the interview of Gandhi with Preston Grover, Gandhi had said that if Jinnah had wanted, he could take him there? Did that happen? Is there any record to show that Jinnah wrote / spoke to Gandhi to change his stand and attend the Conference? What is the point in projecting the so-called grievance?

Page 343: The author narrates that the Viceroy asked all the delegates representing varied interests to hand over a list of persons they would like to be included in the national government. Jinnah posed a lot of conditions. When the Viceroy asked him (Jinnah) whether the League would submit the list of names or not, Jinnah answered that he was there only in his individual capacity. He wanted the Viceroy’s proposal in writing to place before the Working Committee of the League.

Comments: All along Jinnah had been proclaiming that he was the undisputed and sole spokesman for the League. Here he says he has come on his individual capacity. Nevertheless, in his reply to Viceroy, he goes back to what happened during Lord Linlithgow’s time (page 344). Linlithgow’s alternative proposal accepted that the panel of names from the Muslim League would be based on the discussion of the Leader of the party and Viceroy and not on the formal panel of names submitted by the party! He concludes his letter regretting his inability (to forward the names), as desired by the Executive Committee of the League, as the Viceroy could not give the assurance that all the Muslim Members of the proposed Executive Council will be selected from the Muslim League only.

The points to ponder are:

1. The Viceroy had clarified during his face-to-face talk that he can give no such assurance to Jinnah.

2. Jinnah quotes Linlithgow’s acceptance that the list will be based what the Viceroy and the leader of the Party (himself) decide and not what the party sends formally. ( He being the leader of the party wields more authority than the Committee)

3. He then regrets his inability to send the list of names because the Executive Committee of the League desired so. (Here the Committee wields more authority)

Now the reader can come to his own conclusion as to who was responsible for the failure of Simla Conference, even though the Viceroy was gracious enough to apportion the blame on himself

Page 346: Jinnah, who earlier proclaimed that the Muslim League was the champion and protector of all minorities and the Congress did not even represent all Hindus, says in a statement that the representatives of all minorities have the same goal as and ideology of a united India as that of Congress and they are knitted closely to Hindu society. The root cause of the failure was doubtless Jinnah’s intransigence about Muslim representation and equality of the Muslim vote with all others combined.

Comments: Elsewhere in many places in the book the author has blamed Congress and its leaders for delaying the attainment of colonial status, freedom, forming of provisional government etc. How Jinnah played the minorities card is amply explained by the author himself in this page. Jinnah’s demand that League alone would nominate any Muslim member to the Council, in spite of the fact that only Assam and Sindh had League Ministries proves another fact that Jinnah had made up his mind for the partition of India as the price for freedom for the subcontinent. If it has to be delayed indefinitely it mattered nothing to him. The analysis of Dr. Jayakar is very apt. (Page 346)

Page 352: On the announcement of fresh elections in late 1945, the author states that the Congress lost another opportunity by its President not meeting or writing to the Viceroy their wish to return to the office in the provinces from where they were dismissed. The author further concludes that the Viceroy would not have found it easy to refuse; rather he would have welcomed it.

Comments: Yes! If they were today’s politicians they would have even begged the Viceroy . But the principles exhibited by the Congress Party of those days precluded any such effort by its leadership. Also what would have the League done. They would have decried the Congress as hankering after power and with a supportive press in England would have brought the image of the Congress down. How the author has come to the conclusion that the Viceroy would have welcomed such a request has not been substantiated by him.

(However, what the results of the elections demonstrated, is vividly described by the author in pages 354 and 355. In a nutshell, their failure in the elections added further resolve for the League’s demand for Pakistan as they found to their dismay, in a democratic undivided India, they will find themselves only in opposition irrespective of reservations)

Book Reference: Page 302-305

Author’s Views: Elaborating on the Viceroyalty of Lord Linlithgow, the author in page 305 says, that though the British encouraged the demand for Pakistan, by the League, they did not identify themselves with it. (The reader will have a first hand knowledge from the above pages of the book, how Linlithgow did everything in his power and beyond it, to widen the chasm between the Political parties in general and between the Congress and the League in particular)

Comments: The author concedes the role played by the British through the actions of the Viceroy. That they did not identify themselves with the league’s demand of Pakistan is questionable. As we have seen earlier, the demand of the League was a welcome cloak. For once, they were very sure of Nehru’s ascendancy in the free India (and his socialistic leanings) who would not toe the lines of the West blindly. Secondly they would need a buffer state in the West oriented to Western ideology, weak and having dependence on the West. Even before the Note of Field Marshal Auchinleck of 1946, (See Appendix XI to chapter 8 page 557) the requirement of creating a buffer state inimical to the interest of free India and owing allegiance to the Crown in future, in the North West of the subcontinent as a strategic necessity, was recognized by the British. Jinnah’s demand, strengthened by the Viceroy’s partiality and patent support of the League’s demands, came very handy to alienate Congress further and make them accept the Partition as inevitable. (See also author’s remarks in page 305 last five lines.)

Writing on the Gandhi –Jinnah talks of September 1911, the author states that (page 319) Gandhi then wanted an answer from Jinnah as to how the independent states as propounded by him wold be benefited by the split and would they not become a menace to themselves and to the rest of India. Jinnah replied to the effect that it was the only solution of the Indian problem and the price India (ie the rest of India) must pay for its independence.

Comments: After reading the narration of the author, is it not obvious that Jinnah would have opposed tooth and nail the freedom of the subcontinent and the departure of British unless and until his demand for Pakistan was not first met? No doubt that Jinnah is the architect and creator of Pakistan and rightly called as such, but the freedom for India had come only because it had to pay the price as quoted by Jinnah. Why then blame Nehru, Patel or Gandhi or the Congress or even the British. Gandhi’s later inter locution also becomes irrelevant (Pages 322-325) for discussion.

The author in his concluding paragraph of Chapter 6 (Page 330) says that what was sought by the Muslims was just a convincing enough space to safe guard against majoritarianism (what ever it may mean) and enable them to arbitrate their own social, religious and political destinies and a reassuring system, “ ideally (still) in India, but outside, if inevitable.”

How, after himself narrating the back ground for the demand of Pakistan in the preceding pages, the author arrives at the above conclusion that “they still believed it to be ideal to be with in India”, is beyond comprehension. The ‘inevitable’ has been already spelt out by Jinnah, as the price India has to pay for freedom. In page 322 last para commenting on the answer given by Jinnah to a question of Gandhi, the author states that Jinnah wanted the envisaged Pakistan areas would be hostile to the rest of India or would even make war upon her if there was no joint concern. So much for the attitude, the author is craving about in page 330 and for his shedding copious tears for the human tragedy and the hasty vivisection of India entailed (page 331). As Jinnah had aptly put it that was the “price you have to pay if you want freedom from the British.” Are we not still paying the price, even six decades after independence?

Book Reference: Page 297 -298

Author’s Views: Narrating Rajaji’s views on Congress’ opposition to support war efforts, the Muslim League’s demand for a separate government, Rajaji’s recommendations to the AICC meeting on 29 April 1942, his subsequent resignation from the Working Committee on the rejection of his proposals etc., the author concludes that Congress could not assert itself as a spokesman for all. The author states to the effect that the claims that Congress was the only organization that held together the vast spread of India, was disproved.

Comments: The conclusion drawn by the author as above, based on the events leading to resignation of Rajaji, is pathetic to say the least. That the Congress never stifled the voices of dissent is well documented through out its history. The congress politicians those days were of impeccable character. Whenever they felt their views were strong but unacceptable, they resigned without bitterness. From the Congress Party any number of new organizations sprung up owing to differences at various points in time during the Freedom Struggle: Swaraj Party, Forward Block etc. Even Motilal Nehru and later Subash Chandra Bose, why even Gandhi had resigned from the party / party posts( at one time he was the President of the party). They did so, not by coercion but by conviction; and unlike later day politicians they did not bad mouth either the organization or its incumbents after they left the party. Similarly the Party also did not bad mouth those who left owing to differences in opinion, perceptions and policies. So the resignation of Rajaji owing to differences in the policy of co-operating in the war efforts, can in no way make one conclude that Congress could not assert its position. That it took in its stride such resignations of even their stalwarts and heavy weights only proves that Congress as an organization at that time was too encompassing the nation so as not to be rattled by such dissents.

Compare the way as to how Sikandar Hayat and Saadullah of Assam were forced to resign (Page 298 –299) and the way Fazl-ul Haq reacted to the threat of Jinnah. The author’s silence for not arriving at a similar conclusion about the Muslim League based on the above episodes is jarringly loud.